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INTRODUCTION 
A century and a half of economic and political fragility has 
undermined Africa’s ability to engage with or counteract the assaults 
of global economic and political powers. Situational and contractual 
asymmetries, both past and present, have guaranteed economic 
indignity and political powerlessness for almost all African nations 
and their citizens.1 Africa’s human capital, natural wealth, and 
 
  Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I wish to 
thank Professor Fernanda Nicola for inviting me to chair the Panel on Private Law 
and Social Justice in Africa at the XVIIIth Annual Congress of the International 
Association of Comparative Law held in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 2010. I 
also wish to thank the panelists, Raymond Atuguba, Romuald Haule, and 
Rugemeleza Inshala, for their wonderful participation and timely contributions. 
 1. Cf. JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
185-90 (2010) (arguing that rules of international economic governance have 
perpetuated the exploitative nature of colonial economic relations, such as how the 
restrictive theory of immunity supports the right of private actors “to sue and 
recover against third-world States in the courts of the developed world and in 
arbitral forums”); Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of 
Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 904-05 (2000) 
(categorizing European defense of the “right to trade” as legal dressing for 
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strategic advantages have failed to produce tangible economic or 
political benefits for its inhabitants.2 For a long time, this situation 
was blamed on Africa’s dearth of private law and the individualist 
ethos that accompanies such law.3 Consequently, for over a century, 
resources went to private law generating efforts such as reception, 
codification, harmonization, and judicial development.4 This article 
argues that, in place of the traditional commitment to the formal 
development of private law in Africa, international and comparative 
law should instead make situated critiques of private law’s 
performance on the continent. Making the needs and circumstances 
of communities and individuals in Africa the focus of private law is 
not an abandonment of the ideal of formal development. Reorienting 
private law in this way is consistent with democratic governance, 
because private law should operate to the benefit of the governed, as 
well as in the interest of global economic fairness. For private law to 
strengthen Africa’s economic chances and dignitary interests, it must 
move beyond formal development to situational consciousness.  
 
economic exploitation). 
 2. See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil 
Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 2, 
21-25 (2005) (providing evidence of Africa’s “resource curse,” a term describing 
the paradox whereby countries with an abundance of natural resources, particularly 
oil rich countries, often experience low levels of economic growth). 
 3. See, e.g., G.B.A. COKER, FAMILY PROPERTY AMONG THE YORUBAS 3-19 
(1958) (observing that “modern stress” and “a gradual dissolution of family 
dependency” necessitates a transition from “native” to “modern” law, while 
maintaining that Yoruba systems of land tenure are so entrenched they will never 
be fully replaced by foreign law). But see Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, Do African 
Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special Terminology?, 9 J. AFR. L. 114, 114-16 
(1965) (rejecting this position by resisting the call for radical reforms of traditional 
African landholding systems and advocating for a comparative study of land tenure 
systems to identify limited instances where reform or legal integration is 
necessary). 
 4. European studies of African legal systems began in mid-nineteenth century. 
See, e.g., Notes and News, African Customary Law, 1858-1958, 2 J. AFR. L. 139, 
139-45 (1958) (noting the paucity of research on African customary law and 
describing reform efforts in Ghana and then Northern Rhodesia and Basutoland); 
Jill Cottrell, The Tort of Negligence in Nigeria, 17 J. AFR. L. 30, 30, 37 (1973) 
(discussing advancements in Nigerian contributory negligence law following the 
adoption of apportionment legislation in the late 1950s and early 1960s); C. M. 
McDowell, Trespass and Title to Land in the Northern States of Nigeria, 17 J. 
AFR. L. 94, 94 (1973) (analyzing developments in Nigerian law of trespass and 
land entitlement, including judicial understanding of the definitions of “native” and 
“non-native” with respect to the alienation of land). 
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Despite the many achievements of comparative law in the last 
century, the problem of private law in Africa remains, namely that it 
has failed to secure economic dignity and political clout for Africa in 
global affairs. Heartfelt thanks are therefore due to the organizing 
committee of the 2010 Annual Congress of the International 
Association of Comparative Law for inviting and supporting the 
participation of up-and-coming African scholars. The panel provided 
an opportunity to discuss with influential scholars and practitioners 
the distressful failure of private law in Africa even after more than a 
century of codification and harmonization programs. Thanks are 
especially due to Professors Fernanda Nicola, David Snyder, and 
James Feinerman, and the deans of Washington College of Law, 
Georgetown Law Center, and George Washington School of Law for 
supporting and encouraging the work of the panelists.  
I. LIVING BY THE SEA BUT BATHING IN SPITTLE  
In the past, scholars routinely claimed that Africa lacked law and 
private consciousness.5 As a result of these critiques, in the last 
century and a half, significant attention has been paid to the 
development of private law in Africa.6 Far from yielding economic 
independence and political clout, the various outcomes from these 
efforts include the implementation of a positive law scheme which 
maintains a public/private divide and values individualism over 
 
 5. See generally WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 380-492 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that the existence of African law has 
been systematically denied throughout history while noting, ironically, that African 
law is often blamed for hindering development); James Thuo Gathii, Retelling 
Good Governance Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political Predicaments: 
Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 
45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 975, 1035 (2000) (analyzing how modernist discourse cast 
Africa as “trapped in conditions of nature as opposed to consciousness” and tracing 
the persistence of this discourse in current economic development initiatives); 
Sylvia Kang’ara, Analytical, Prescriptive, and Resistant Characterizations of 
“African” Conceptions of Property: A Critique of Mainstream Assumptions about 
African-Western Incompatibility 3 (2003) (unpublished SJD Dissertation, Harvard 
Law School) (on file with author) (questioning the “African-EuroAmerican legal 
incompatibility” theory). 
 6. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, Private International Law Scholarship in 
Africa (1884-2009)--A Selected Bibliography, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 321-22 
(2010) (describing the growth of African private law through the rise of private 
international law study in African universities and efforts to harmonize laws in 
African nations). 
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communitarianism, a near monopoly by African states over formal 
lawmaking and enforcement within this scheme,7 and the 
development of local private law institutional capacities by African 
governments with the assistance of renowned international scholars.8  
Thus, the initiatives to develop private law appear increasingly 
disconnected from real needs. Indeed, the development of private 
law in Africa has occurred within a conceptual framework that can 
be analogized to a train on rails, with the rails signifying liberal 
classical legal thought.9 Like trains on a rail, governments, scholars, 
and international institutions following this framework have 
historically moved in one direction and sought one outcome, namely, 
an individualistic unitary private law regime.10 This single-track 
approach has deceptively lent private law an appearance of 
 
 7. See MENSKI, supra note 5, at 485-86 (noting that African leaders have 
“learnt to copy the bad and dangerous elements of positivist circularity,” and to 
manipulate the state for their own benefit). 
 8. See, e.g., Jan L. Neels, The Revocation of Wills in South African Private 
International Law, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 613 (2007) (highlighting the influence 
of the Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of 
Testamentary Dispositions and other state practice on domestic private law in 
South Africa, particularly the South African Wills Act 7 of 1953); Sylvia 
Kang’ara, Globalization of Law: Anglo-American Legal Thought in African 
Family Law and the Limits of a Jurisprudence of Pre-Commitments 4-7 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (arguing that the reliance of 
African courts and legislatures on Anglo-American legal thought has led to 
“systemic incoherence” and injustice in African family law); see also Oppong, 
supra note 6, at 319-20 (acknowledging that while private international law 
scholarship in Africa has not received broad international recognition, it has 
nevertheless had a marked impact on the development of African private law). 
 9. See, e.g., Paul Brietzke, Private Law in Ethiopia, 18 J. AFR. L. 149, 160 
(1974) (“The outstanding characteristics of Ethiopian private law are its orientation 
towards nineteenth century capitalism and the lack of meliorating provisions 
associated with the welfare state in the West and with broadly-based development 
in the Third World.”). 
 10. For useful critiques of neoclassical legal and economic thought, see 
generally Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 2 LIBERTY, 
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW: MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 
291 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000); Duncan Kennedy, Neither the Market Nor the 
State: Housing Privatization Issues, in A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, 
PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 253 (Gregory S. 
Alexander & Grażyna Skąpska eds., 1994); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, 
Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); and 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980). 
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coherence and, worse, turned its development into an isolated goal. 
A century’s worth of private law writings on Africa gives the 
impression that governments, scholars, and the international 
community neither understand Africa’s true priorities nor require that 
private law benefit the continent’s inhabitants.11 In fleeting moments, 
scholars, governments, and international institutions claim that 
private law reform will spur economic development and therefore 
improve the circumstances of all.12 Still, private law scholarship 
leaves one with the feeling that reform is being pursued for its own 
sake; the activities of codifying law, requiring seals, and creating 
document registries or courts, do not seem awfully relevant to 
prevalent food insecurity, environmental devastation, social 
dislocation, low wages, or the grotesque labor conditions prevailing 
in most African countries.13 This disconnect between private law and 
the lived experience of the majority has led to an undesirable 
dependence on family, the African state, and charity—a dependence 
that amounts to an unacknowledged subsidy of private enterprise in 
Africa. 
To reduce this cycle of dependence, this article proposes a shift 
from the traditional focus on the formal development of private law 
 
 11. See Brietzke, supra note 9, at 153 (suggesting that private law codes in 
Ethiopia are not responsive to “Ethiopian needs and demands” and therefore will 
not promote development); see also Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and 
the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 32 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (critiquing the “sweeping claims” of 
private law scholars and challenging the presumed efficiency of private property). 
 12. See, e.g., Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law 
as an Enabling and Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 514-15 
(2005) (describing the proliferation of Rule of Law projects in developing 
countries in connection with “the second wave of the Law and Development 
movement,” the purported goal of which is to spur economic growth and 
democracy). 
 13. Paul Brietzke’s observations about Ethiopian private law ring true today for 
much of Africa: 
Whose interests do the Civil and Commercial Codes serve? They do not meet the 
needs and demands of the "ordinary" Ethiopian since the Codes are neither for the 
most part orientated towards traditional laws nor do they promote development. The 
Codes have, rather, followed a middle path which served the interests of those who 
would preserve the status quo -- the westernized, landed and urbanized elite, and the 
practical effect of the Codes has been the appearance rather than the reality of reform. 
They are elegant status symbols: learned, concise, doctrinal and, perhaps, intellectually 
satisfying. All they lack is an essential link with contemporary Ethiopian realities. 
Brietzke, supra note 9, at 167. 
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to a much-needed situational critique of private law’s performance in 
Africa. A situational critique is one that first and foremost looks at 
law’s promise vis-à-vis its practice—such a critique is therefore 
relentless in its opposition to legal abstraction.14 Situational critiques 
have the potential to reveal that the conceptual rails guiding private 
law programs in Africa are not only unconvincing and incoherent on 
their own terms,15 but are also incapable of meeting basic 
expectations of fairness and justice. Relying on such problematic 
conceptual rails, governments, scholars, and international institutions 
remain incapable of harnessing private law to secure economic 
dignity and political power for Africa in a world where these two 
elements are indispensable to survival.  
These conceptual rails have led the development of private law in 
Africa astray, resulting in a system that routinely fails to promote fair 
dealing or leave the costs of private activity with their source.16 First, 
the private law regime feeds on the African family system, while 
castigating it for being neither private nor efficient.17 Second, the 
human rights framework—with which African states are obligated to 
comply under public international law, and more recently under new, 
pro-democracy constitutions passed in some African nations18—
requires the state to mop-up the social costs of private law sanctioned 
 
 14. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to 
Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 200-01 (1987) (highlighting the benefits of 
critical legal studies and recognizing that the inability of broad legal prescriptions 
to account for variety and nuance render them ineffective in practice). 
 15. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 11, at 30-31 (exposing the incoherence in 
economic rationales for private property by illuminating additional premises 
underlying the regime). 
 16. For a theoretical framework on the role of private law, see generally 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing the tension between individualism and altruism 
underlying private law systems); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972) (explaining the “problem of entitlement,” 
which invariably requires a legal system to choose between conflicting interests); 
Michelman, supra note 11, at 21-32 (examining the moral premises and arguments 
underlying private property). 
 17. See infra Part VII. 
 18. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, art. 40 (2010) (Kenya) (providing right to the 
protection of property); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 25 (noting that “[n]o one may 
be [arbitrarily] deprived of property”). 
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activity.19 Finally, international donor aid and private charities, both 
secular and religious, also routinely subsidize such sanctioned 
activity.20  
This situation raises important normative questions. For example, 
why should African families, the African state, and local and 
international charities subsidize private activity that leads to serious 
social dislocation, capital flight, and political upheaval?21 The 
subsidization of private activity by families, states, and charities is a 
blow to the dignitary interests of Africans. This system of subsidies 
retards the development of private law in Africa and undermines the 
economic and political power of Africans. Further, it creates an 
unacknowledged dependency of private actors on non-private 
institutions, while casting Africans as helpless recipients of charity 
and perpetuating irreparable economic indignities and political 
powerlessness.22 
This article does not claim that family, the state, and charity have 
no role to play in Africa’s pursuit of economic dignity and political 
 
 19. See David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of 
the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109 (2002) (recognizing that in 
focusing on “public remedies” for private harms, the human rights movement 
ultimately “leaves unattended or enhanced the powers and felt entitlements of 
private actors”). 
 20. See A. N. Allott, Credit and the Law in Africa: A Special Study of Some 
Legal Aspects of Economic Development, 19 J. AFR. L. 73, 73-74 (1975) (noting 
that African countries lack quick access to large amounts of capital and outlining 
various types of international and domestic credit suppliers on the continent). 
 21. See generally GATHII, supra note 1 (exploring the relationship between 
economics and war, noting that “dependency theorists” believed international aid 
favored industrial development at the expense of the poor agricultural sectors in 
Africa). 
 22. See Betty Plewes & Rieky Stuart, The Pornography of Poverty: A 
Cautionary Fundraising Tale, in ETHICS IN ACTION: THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 23, 30-31 
(Daniel A. Bell & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds., 2007) (noting the image of the poor 
African family is often used to raise money for development aid, leading to an 
“extractive” relationship between African families and international organizations).  
[I]nternational governance errs when it imagines itself capable of governing, 
‘intervening’ if you will, without taking responsibility for the messy business of 
allocating stakes in society—when it intervenes only economically and not politically, 
only in public and not in private life, only ‘consensually’ without acknowledging the 
politics of influence, only to freeze the situation and not to improve it, ‘neutrally’ as 
between the parties, politically/economically but not culturally, and so forth. 
Kennedy, supra note 19, at 122. 
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power, or that private enterprise can exist without the support of 
public institutions. Rather, the claim here is that the subsidies that 
these institutions grant to private enterprise continue to go 
unacknowledged, and this is inconsistent with private law’s 
perpetuation of individualism as an important conceptual rail upon 
which these programs run. Private law perpetuates injustice when it 
mistakenly assumes that private enterprise relies exclusively on 
individual capital. This in effect creates the social conditions that 
make it possible for private enterprise to exploit without 
acknowledgment its dependence on community capital. Thus, in 
order to take private law seriously in Africa, representatives of the 
people and the legal profession must make elementary demands of 
private law regimes in Africa to assure fair dealing, fair returns, 
compensation for harm of individuals and communities occasioned 
by private enterprise, and responsible resource sharing between 
private owners and local communities. As the adage goes, those who 
live by the sea should not bath in spittle. Taking private law seriously 
means figuring out why resource-rich communities remain 
economically destitute, the frequent and unenviable recipients of 
charity, even after installing investor-friendly legal institutions. 
Context-specific reform of private law in Africa is difficult so long 
as current perceptions of Western private law persist. Private law in 
Africa is founded on the claim that in order to make African society 
“as good as” Western society, governments must introduce copious 
amounts of Western private law.23 The assumption is that economic 
development is an essential plank of an advanced society,24 and that 
economic development in Africa cannot succeed without implanting 
Western private law.25 Although capitalism, socialism, communism, 
 
 23. See, e.g., Brietzke, supra note 9, at 150-51 (suggesting that French scholars 
adopted this perspective in drafting the Ethiopian Civil and Commercial Codes). 
 24. See J. C. Smith, The Unique Nature of the Concepts of Western Law, 46 
CANADIAN B. REV. 191, 199-208 (1968) (discussing the modern Western concepts 
of property and contract, finding that, “[t]he increasing complexity of modern 
society, requiring a high degree of stability of expectations in regard to individual 
behavior, could be possible only through such highly technical jural constructs”). 
 25. See, e.g., S. K. Date-Bah, Aspects of the Role of Contract in the Economic 
Development of Ghana, 17 J. AFR. L. 254, 260 (1973) (noting that while customary 
contract law in Ghana regulates “smaller-scale contracts at the grass roots level,” 
English law played a greater role in facilitating economic development because it 
regulated “larger-scale business contracts of the modern sector”); cf. David M. 
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
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and feudalism are all Western legal-economic systems,26 in Africa 
“Western” means capitalism.27 Possessive individualism and positive 
statehood are the most critical attributes of “Western” private law in 
the African context.28 Comparative studies which portray these 
attributes as superior to “traditional” African legal and economic 
concepts not only make it difficult to challenge Western-derived 
private law in Africa, they are elements of the conceptual railing 
project that discourage creative solutions to weaknesses in African 
private law.29 
 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 
1062, 1080-93 (explaining how doubts about the liberal legalism paradigm led to a 
crisis in the law and development movement). 
 26. For a closer examination of these legal-economic systems, see generally 
BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: 
LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1966); 1 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1968) (1898); Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael Heller & Christopher Serkin, 
Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385 
(1999) (reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE 
LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES (1998)). 
 27. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 
1972 WIS. L. REV. 720, 739-45 (finding Weber’s concept of legalism to be 
“intimately related” with capitalism). See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION (Beacon Press 1957) (1944) (examining the rise of the modern 
capitalist economy). 
 28. See, e.g., Christopher Roederer, The Transformation of South African 
Private Law After Ten Years of Democracy: The Role of Torts (Delict) in the 
Consolidation of Democracy, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 450-52 (2006) 
(highlighting the developments in private law in post-apartheid South Africa as 
evidence of the importance of “democratic transformation” in creating a body of 
private law that can remedy injustice); see also Allott, supra note 20, at 76-77 
(explaining that the impetus behind reforms of traditional land tenure systems in 
Africa is “the desire to give the African farmer a holding which will be a 
chargeable asset if he wishes to obtain credit for development of his land”). 
 29. See Sylvia Kang’ara, supra note 5, at 185 (“If African-Western conceptual 
incompatibility is a mere theoretical derivation, a part of an economic or legal 
orthodoxy, one should be able to challenge it and question its assumptions. The 
more it is identified with folkness (Africanness or Westernness), the less open to 
challenge.”). 
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II. LIMITS TO PRAGMATIC REGARD FOR 
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW  
Although proponents of private law in Africa seek to re-create the 
socio-economic experience of the West in Africa, many scholars 
advocate an approach that gives due regard to African customary 
law.30 Regard for such law has been demonstrated in various ways: 
studying, recognizing, codifying, reforming, and supplementing it.31  
This commitment to customary law has taken at least two forms. 
Some take customary law on its own terms.32 Others seek to establish 
its content, normative substance, and conceptual character for a 
variety of purposes: in order to make judicial ascertainment by 
modern courts and administration by state bureaucracies possible;33 
to advance pluralist modernization by integrating and harmonizing 
national laws;34 or to make legal cartographical comparisons with 
 
 30. See, e.g., Stephen Cretney, The Application of Equitable Doctrines by the 
Courts in East Africa, 12 J. AFR. L. 119, 128 (1968) (suggesting equitable 
doctrines facilitate the adaptation of private law to local circumstances); Kenneth 
Roberts-Wray, The Need for Study of Native Law, 1 J. AFR. L. 82, 85-86 (1957) 
(calling for a “reconciliation” between English and “native” law in Africa, and 
predicting that “native law” will continue to operate mainly at the local level). 
 31. See, e.g., A. J. Kerr, The Reception and Codification of Systems of Law in 
Southern Africa, 2 J. AFR. L. 82, 92-95, 100 (1958); see also Gordon Woodman, 
The Ghana Conveyancing Decree, 1973, and the Customary Law, 17 J. AFR. L. 
300, 300 (1973) (discussing Ghana’s recording statute which extended English 
recording principles and implied terms to customary conveyances). 
 32. See, e.g., Sanele Sibanda, When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on 
Customary Law Under South Africa’s Constitutional Dispensation, 17 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF, No. 3, 2010, at 31, 33 (urging that reforms of South African customary law 
take place in a democratic fashion to avoid “reproducing the bifurcated state form 
and decentralized despotism characteristic of [the apartheid] era”). 
 33. See, e.g., A. N. Allott, Towards a Definition of “Absolute Ownership”, 5 J. 
AFR. L. 98, 100 (1961) (attempting to define “absolute ownership” in “the most 
convenient and least misleading language in which to present the facts of African 
land law” for the practical purpose of title registration). 
 34.  Harmonization programs have sought integration of domestic laws for 
political, nation-building purposes. See Antony Allott, The Unification of Laws in 
Africa, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 61-62 (1968) (“There is scarcely an African country 
. . . which is not plagued by tribal and regional tensions and conflicts . . . . So it is 
not just the political manifestations of separatism which are outlawed, but the 
cultural and legal ones too.”). This type of harmonization is different from the 
regional and sub-regional economic harmonization advocated by some scholars. 
See, e.g., A. M. Akiwumi, A Plea for the Harmonization of African Investment 
Laws, 19 J. AFR. L. 134, 139 (1975) (noting that the lack of harmony in African 
investment law is “a fertile field for exploitation by investors to the detriment of 
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other private law regimes of the world.35 The first approach strongly 
affirms African customary private law and places an enormous 
burden on the researcher-observer to avoid looking at preexisting law 
through the lens of his own legal system.36 The first approach also 
lacks the positive prescriptive transformative agenda that is the 
raison d’être of the second.  
Despite their different approaches, proponents on both sides 
consider customary law for pragmatic reasons, namely the fact that it 
is commonly understood and widely utilized by many Africans.37 It is 
also highly adaptable to changing conditions. In certain cases, 
modern courts have used its rules and principles to fill gaps in formal 
private law. Furthermore, formal private law is not accessible by the 
vast majority of low and mid-level entrepreneurs because of barriers 
such as language, distance, and expense. Writing is a predominant 
feature of formal private law transactions and litigation. In most 
countries, foreign languages are the language of law, which excludes 
all but formally trained lawyers from its practice. In spite of these 
pragmatic calculations, proponents of the formal development of 
African law tend to limit customary private law to certain 
 
inter-African co-operation and the rational economic development of host 
countries”). 
 35. See, e.g., MAX GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE xv 
(1965) (comparing the judicial reasoning of the Barotse legal system with Western 
concepts). See generally MENSKI, supra note 5, at 4 (exploring the relationship 
between globalization and law by examining the legal systems of Africa and Asia). 
 36. See PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV 4-6 (1957) 
(discussing the challenge of a legal anthropologist to “report accurately the ideas 
and institutions of the people he has studied, in a language . . . in which most of the 
words and concepts of social control have been pre-empted by jurists and given 
precise and technical meanings”). 
 37. See MENSKI, supra note 5, at 492 (affirming the continued relevance of 
African customary law “mainly because people themselves are taking recourse to 
such rules while state institutions are not able to lend them much support in sorting 
out problems in their daily lives”). 
One occasionally meets people, even among those who have lived or served in Africa, 
who speak light-heartedly about the study of native law and native courts and seem to 
imply that it is an esoteric exercise of little more practical importance than, say, 
archaeology . . . . Native customary law . . . affects and, to some extent, governs the 
conduct of millions of human beings. Moreover, there is no reason for thinking that the 
state of health of parts of native law is more delicate than that of the common law of 
England in the Middle ages, and it seems to follow that those parts must continue in 
force, or at least have profound influence, indefinitely. 
Roberts-Wray, supra note 30, at 82. 
1136 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
circumstances. Specifically, they argue that due regard for customary 
law is not necessary if: (1) parties to a dispute are non-Africans;38 (2) 
a state is pursuing certain social and economic policies crucial to 
achieve economic development, for instance, by introducing 
individual land titling systems;39 (3) an African as an individual 
affirmatively chooses to sever links with the customary system 
bringing all his affairs whether commercial or familial under non-
customary law;40 (4) African private law is inconsistent with 
universal human rights and moral individualism;41 (5) a state has 
usurped a particular field, such as criminal law, that had been 
previously governed by customary law, in order to strengthen the 
state’s sovereign powers and to eliminate problems precluding the 
consistent and just administration of law;42 (6) it is essential to 
achieve uniform laws and streamline judicial systems;43 and (7) it is 
 
 38. See, e.g., T. OLAWALE ELIAS, BRITISH COLONIAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ENGLISH LOCAL LAWS IN BRITISH 
DEPENDENCIES 82 (1962) (discussing legal dualism in former British colonies, 
whereby native courts operated alongside British courts, which applied English 
law in cases involving a non-native or non-customary disputes). 
 39. See Janine M. Ubink, Tenure Security: Wishful Policy Thinking or Reality? 
A Case from Peri-Urban Ghana, 51 J. AFR. L. 215, 246-48 (2007) (concluding that 
customary land tenure in Ghana has produced insecurity, largely due to the erosion 
of traditional checks and balances on local chiefs, and cautioning that a positive 
stance toward customary tenure systems “should [not] be based on idealized 
notions of customary law, often brought forth by traditional authorities 
themselves”); see also Shana Hofstetter, Note, The Interaction of Customary Law 
and Microfinance: Women’s Entry into the World Economy, 14 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 337, 337 (2007) (examining how customary law in Morocco and the 
Dominican Republic hinders microfinance programs for women). 
 40. For a discussion of methods for solving conflicts of personal law in Africa, 
see generally T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 49-70 (2004) 
(defining personal conflicts as those “arising from the litigants’ attachment to 
different cultures or religions”). 
 41. But cf. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of 
Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 204-05 (2001) (cautioning that the 
“universal” human rights corpus is largely Eurocentric and fails to incorporate 
non-Western norms). 
 42. See, e.g., Lynn Berat, The Future of Customary Law in Namibia: A Call for 
an Integration Model, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 15, 17 (1991) 
(contending that forum shopping in criminal matters is particularly dangerous and 
proposing a rule whereby Swazi customary courts would be required to apply 
national criminal law). 
 43. See Roberts-Wray, supra note 30, at 83 (“It cannot be seriously denied that 
the ideal for any country is one law and one judicial system for everybody. There 
must therefore be a process of reconciliation between the English law and the 
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necessary to fill gaps where customary law has not evolved whole 
areas of law considered in Western jurisprudence critical to 
economic development and social modernization, for instance 
contract and commercial law.44 
These recommendations seek to reorient private law in Africa to 
the benefit of individual Africans, the state, and foreign investors in 
new ways. Given the theory that Western private law attracts foreign 
investment and that foreign investment in turn drives economic 
development, it is shocking that Africa’s economic prospects remain 
so grim particularly because the wellbeing of foreign investors has 
always been a principal concern of private law in Africa.45 In reality, 
Africa has always been an attractive destination for foreign investors 
because private law in Africa promotes extractive devaluation, not 
progressive valuation of existing conditions. Indeed, foreign 
investment is driven by attraction to resources, not to the creation of 
a thriving and cohesive legal universe of reciprocal rights and duties 
and intra-class interdependence.46 Thus, contract law has not 
 
native law.”). 
 44. Id. at 84 (“One cannot hope to find commercial customs, such as those 
from which Lord Mansfield moulded a segment of the common law, in a 
community in whose philosophy the transactions to which they relate are 
undreamed of.”). For a critique of this view, see Brietzke, supra note 9, at 150 
(“These views mistake the nature of pre-existing Ethiopian law by finding its 
essence in form rather than function and by uncritically transferring French 
assumptions in areas where the Ethiopian legal environment is not understood. 
Contract is obviously equated with modem French contract, since even subsistence 
trade is contractually regulated, and notions of reciprocity, duty and the bargained-
for regulation of social and economic relations-elements of a more relevant 
contract definition-have existed in Ethiopia for many years. Likewise historically 
significant commercial customs and practices have existed in Ethiopia for 
thousands of years, and modernizing codes could have been drafted that take these 
practices into account.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Brietzke, supra note 9, at 162 (explaining that Ethiopian private 
law was written with the utilitarian end of promoting foreign investment at the 
acknowledged expense of rural enterprises). 
 46. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 19, 20 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (noting that 
economic actors in the capitalist West influenced the pursuit of “laissez-faire” 
policies so the law would not “constrain their pursuit of power and profit”); Joseph 
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1026, 1031 (discussing the doctrine 
of damnum absque injuria or “damage without legal wrong” in the context of 
economic competition). 
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operated to balance the interests of foreign investors to make profit 
against those of host states to achieve economic development in 
Africa.47 
III. CRITIQUES OF CUSTOMARY PRIVATE LAW 
Indeed, the pursuit of the private law system since colonization to 
the present has led to outcomes that undermine the core assumptions 
and promises of private law in Africa.48 Thus, disregard for African 
customary law is only justified if customary law hinders economic 
development, and Western private law actually fulfills its promise. In 
such a case, it would not be necessary to distinguish between 
customary and Western law because the latter would be cognizant of 
and responsive to local needs. Disregard for African customary law 
based on the argument that it impedes economic development has 
turned out to be an official blind spot because customary law remains 
very influential in actual economic relations of Africans.49 
Customary law persists for many reasons: it is familiar; it is less 
costly to access because it operates without a formal bureaucracy; 
 
 47. See Date-Bah, supra note 25, at 265 (explaining the necessity for host 
states and private investors to utilize institutions of coordination, such as 
“concession agreements,” to establish a complimentary system that alleviates the 
conflict of interests between the host state and the private investor). 
 48. See Kang’ara, supra note 8. See generally WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF 
PRIVATE LAW (2007) (focusing on the principles of Anglo-American private law). 
 49. See Brietzke, supra note 9, at 155 (“The theoretical repeal of traditional 
laws epitomizes [the characterization of] Ethiopian private law as ‘fantasy law.’ 
Many centuries of legal history are not transformed into a tabula rasa so easily. In 
rural, and, to a large extent, urban Ethiopia, effective everyday social control is 
maintained under the traditional laws which are misunderstood and mistrusted by 
professional and academic lawyers alike. Recourse to ‘government law’ only 
occurs in extraordinary cases-penal problems, tax disputes, and cases in which 
traditional dispute settlement has failed. Even in these cases, the judge is often 
unaware of the existence of relevant state-sanctioned law, misunderstands it, or 
refuses to apply it. . . . Traditional law places a relatively greater emphasis on the 
past relationships and relative status of the parties to a dispute, rendering the 
disengagement of the economy from traditional social structures more difficult.”); 
see also Mauro Bussani, Tort Law and Development: Insights into the Case of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, 40 J. AFR. L. 43, 48 (1996) (detailing how customary tort 
law in African states, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea, plays an important function 
in solving interpersonal conflicts to the benefit of African economies); Janet L. 
Roitman, The Politics of Informal Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 J. MOD. AFR. 
STUD. 671, 672 (1990) (encouraging the inclusion of analysis of informal and 
societal-based economics in the study of African economic markets). 
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and it affords individuals immediate benefits formal law fails to 
compute or value.50 For instance, information, a critical component 
of economic activity,51 comes to an economic player through many 
customary channels unknown to or unauthorized by formal law. The 
customary system also assures access to certain markets for 
individuals locked out of formally constituted industries,52 and it 
provides low-cost credit facilities to a majority lacking access to 
formal banking services.53 
Presumably, there are social and economic costs to transacting 
under customary law if the state considers it an impediment to 
economic activity, but the continued use of customary economic 
channels by various communities within Africa suggests either that 
the benefits outweigh the costs or that no viable alternative exists. 
This phenomenon highlights in turn the existence of a complex 
family-state-market relationship and a stratified formal/informal 
economic system.54 One immediate effect of this arrangement is the 
 
 50. See, e.g., Brietzke, supra note 9, at 158 (noting how merchants in Ethiopia 
prefer traditional arbitration by local elders to governmental courts unless the 
dispute involves large sums of money, complex issues, foreign parties, or criminal 
matters); cf. L. Amede Obiora, Reconsidering African Customary Law, 17 LEGAL 
STUD. F. 219, 224 (1993) (emphasizing the malleable nature of customary law that 
allows for adaptation of traditional norms and standards to contemporary 
circumstances). 
 51. See generally ERIC RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 8 (1981) 
(discussing the economics of uncertainty, the relationship between information and 
economic risk). 
 52. See Date-Bah, supra note 25, at 258 (“The chief contribution of the 
customary law of contract has been in the rural areas. It has been an important 
instrumentality through which the rural population have [sic] been able to 
participate in the cash economy. In other words, the customary law of contract has 
played a role in the switch from subsistence production to production for exchange 
(or commercial agriculture) in the rural agricultural areas of Ghana.”). 
 53. William F. Steel et al., Informal Financial Markets Under Liberalization in 
Four African Countries, 25 WORLD DEV. 817, 817-18 (1997) (maintaining that 
informal financial institutions promote economic growth by increasing household 
savings and small-scale business opportunities). But see Irfan Aleem, Imperfect 
Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural 
Credit Market in Pakistan, 4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 329, 347 (commenting 
that though informal credit mechanisms oftentimes allow for greater access to 
credit for farmers, in many cases, imperfections and a lack of information in the 
informal system cause farmers who are receiving loans to agree to contract terms 
without full awareness of possibly widely varying, high interest rates). 
 54. See, e.g., Steel et al., supra note 54, at 818 (categorizing African financial 
systems, from a study of these systems in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania, 
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association of the formal economic system with “proper” private 
investment and the informal economic system with underclass 
activity.55 The former is accessible by only a small but wealthy 
minority.56 At the same time, the formal private investment system is 
also heavily subsidized by the state, which poses a significant 
challenge to the democratic foundations of the African state.57 
Still, academics have long argued that customary law systems of 
ownership hinder economic development. 58 These arguments are 
derived from Western private law theories such as the tragedy of the 
commons—the notion that a commonly held resource is bound to be 
overused, producing a net loss to society.59 Customary law is also 
criticized on the theory that economic advancement depends on 
freedom of alienation, which common property systems generally 
prohibit.60 By allowing the simultaneous recognition of multiple 
 
as fragmented due to the simultaneous operation of formal and informal economies 
that serve different clientele with no apparent connections); see also Roitman, 
supra note 50, at 677 (contending that proper analysis of African economic 
markets within an African context must recognize the influence local societies and 
informal markets have on the efficiency of the state’s markets). 
 55. See Steel et al., supra note 54, at 818 (concluding that the mostly elite 
focus of formal economic institutions often do not “match the characteristics and 
demands of the . . . low-income, small-scale and rural population in most African 
countries”). 
 56. See id. at 818, 822 (describing reluctance on the part of formal financial 
institutions to finance small borrowers due to these institutions’ inability to access 
reliable information about small clients because of their geographical remoteness, 
illiteracy, and unreliable incomes). 
 57. See id. at 818 (referring to the financial repression hypothesis that directs 
blame for inefficient and underdeveloped financial institutions to states’ repressive 
financial policies that arise from the subsidization of priority activities). 
 58. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 26, at 639-40 (concluding that the recognition 
of multiple owners’ rights of exclusion over a single property in Russia often led to 
a significant amount of unused properties that thus limited economic opportunities 
and caused diminished job opportunities). But see Robert W. Gordon, Hayek and 
Cooter on Custom and Reason, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 453, 459 (1994) (arguing that 
common customary rights, through binding multiple owners or users of property, 
could result in efficient regimes based upon mutual insurance against risks and 
instability). 
 59. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 26, at 677; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (illustrating how rational individuals weigh 
the costs and benefits of the use of the “commons” from an individual point of 
view rather than from a communal point of view to the detriment of the finite 
resources available to all people). 
 60. See e.g., COKER, supra note 3, at 35, 57 (noting that “immovable property,” 
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interest holders over one parcel of property, common ownership 
prevents access to credit and therefore prevents investment in land 
since banks want to lend only to individuals and against registered 
title.61 Where title is held by a group, individual members of the 
group will not invest in the property because without exclusive 
ownership, they will not reap exclusive benefits from investment.62 
Moreover, determining ownership absent title registration is costly 
and difficult.  
Under the freedom of alienation theory, customary land tenure 
also limits upward mobility.63 Individuals moving to urban centers as 
laborers, contractors, students, or professionals who have made the 
choice to sever links with their ancestral lands and customary 
regimes suffer huge losses because they are not allowed to sell off 
their interests. The customary system, which on one hand requires 
them to maintain ancestral links, tends to offend the Western concept 
of individual liberty at two levels—at the level of personal choice, 
the choice to sever links, and at the level of freedom to alienate 
commonly held property. In other words, the choice to detach from 
the customary system is “taxed” through the involuntary and 
uncompensated surrender of wealth held in customary strongholds.64 
 
such as land and houses, are considered “family property” and therefore 
inalienable by an individual under Yoruba customary law). 
 61. See, e.g., Allott, supra note 20, at 76 (1975) (describing the land 
consolidation program in Kenya to demonstrate how one of the main motivations 
for land tenure reform with Africa is to supply individuals with a “chargeable 
asset” to be able to obtain credit); see also U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., Land 
Tenure Systems and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
ECA/SA/EGM.Land/2003/2 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter ECA Report] (noting that 
customary systems hold property in “communal trust” such that it cannot be used 
as collateral). 
 62. See Lee Godden & Maureen Tehan, Introduction: A Sustainable Future for 
Communal Lands, Resources, and Communities, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
ON COMMUNAL LANDS AND INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP: SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 1, 1 
(Lee Godden & Maureen Tehan eds., 2010) (arguing that strong pressures from 
globalization have resulted in an increased push for individualization of land 
tenure systems as individual ownership of land is seen as the key in providing 
property protections); ECA Report, supra note 62, at 7 (noting additional 
arguments against customary land tenure, including that communal systems fail to 
promote efficient use of land). 
 63. Cf. ECA Report, supra note 62, at 8-11 (suggesting that rural farmers 
operating under a customary land tenure system are often vulnerable to 
exploitation). 
 64. Cf. COKER, supra note 3, at 118-19 (explaining that alienation of family 
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All the above factors make for tragic outcomes. Since those who 
are moving from rural to urban areas are prevented from liquidating 
their customary interests, they move to the urban areas without any 
capital. This dynamic has contributed to urban poverty in Africa, 
represented largely by the image of rural laborers working and living 
in Africa’s legendary slums, and surviving at the mercy of 
international charity and government handouts.65 The rural 
communities they leave behind do not benefit either, even though 
one could claim that such communities have been unjustly enriched 
by this involuntary surrender of property interests initiated by urban 
migration. Instead, the rural customary system loses human capital to 
urban migration and rural economies remain dormant because those 
who leave for urban areas do not liquidate land.66 Further, urban 
dwellers become a tax on rural areas by using their relatively easy 
access to political platforms to influence government policies. For 
instance, they advocate for the suppression of prices of produce 
grown in the countryside.67 Urban voters also influence the 
channeling of government revenues away from rural exports to urban 
infrastructural development such as the building of superhighways, 
international airports, etc.68 These projects are big budget items on 
government budgets even though in many instances they are either 
mere symbols of modernity or important to only heavy capital 
investors. Thus, this system perpetuates rural-urban migration 
 
properties in Nigerian customary law systems is improper and voidable without the 
consent of all other “principle representatives” of the family holding interest in the 
property). 
 65. See generally U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, THE CHALLENGE 
OF SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2003 25-27 (2003), 
available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2003.0.pdf 
(detailing how rural laborers and dependents of farmers of communal lands are 
increasingly displaced into urban areas to live in slums, which are densely 
populated environments with low standards of living and housing). 
 66. Cf. COKER, supra note 3, at 119. 
 67. See David Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending in Africa, 49 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 343, 345 (2005) (discussing the possible greater influence urban 
groups have over rural groups in influencing a state’s political and economic 
sphere as a result of the urban population’s geographical advantage that allows for 
greater collective action). But see U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, supra 
note 66, at 26-27 (questioning the validity of the “urban bias” taxation theory). 
 68. See Steel et al., supra note 54, at 818 (emphasizing that government 
directives often focus on funneling monetary funds into public sector projects 
focused in urban development). 
 
2011] PRIVATE LAW IN AFRICA 1143 
particularly negatively, and ultimately affects both the rural and 
urban poor. 
In addition to the problems associated with rural-urban migration, 
the above factors also add to the tragic exploitation of rural 
communities and individuals by politicians, foreign and local 
investors, banks, and other institutional players. These players have 
the ability to persuade or force governments to pass laissez faire 
legislation, despite the fact that customary law continues to be 
indispensible to economic activity.69 As the layers of private law pile 
on, the more the above-enumerated problems persist, the more 
customary law becomes relevant, and the more customary law is 
blamed for the mass of problems. 
IV. THE TRAP INHERENT IN EFFICIENCY 
ARGUMENTS 
To end the cycle of tragic outcomes, proponents of reform 
introduce more foreign law into Africa’s private law system.70 The 
recommendations outlined above in Part II are tailored to limit the 
scope of customary law and allow formal private law to take hold. 
They are expected to alleviate the negative effects resulting from the 
current interplay between customary and formal law in Africa. By 
now, customary law has been acknowledged and cannot be 
eliminated. However, social and economic dependency cannot be 
lessened without limitations on the scope of customary law. On one 
hand, proponents of private law development tend to blame the 
failure of the current private law regime on customary legal regimes. 
 
 69. Cf. Joel M. Ngugi, Forgetting Lochner in the Journey from Plan to Market: 
The Framing Effect of the Market Rhetoric in Market-Oriented Reforms, 56 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1, 79 (2008) (discussing how private economic actors constantly redefine 
and morph economic systems through both formal and informal methods to 
influence government norms and to modify economic rule of law). 
 70. This argument may seem counterintuitive in light of some scholars’ 
critiques of international economic governance as inherently imbalanced in favor 
of capital-exporting states. See, e.g., GATHII, supra note 1, at 186-90 (arguing that 
“these rules continue to perpetuate the subordinate position of these formerly 
colonial countries in a manner that uncannily reflects the imbalances that 
characterized colonial rule”). As Part VI will show, however, this article locates 
the problem in the interplay between Western and African law. Thus, the solution 
to aggressively introduce more foreign law makes sense because the state, African 
families, and international donors will continue to mop up the costs of the current 
private law system unless a more effective system is introduced. 
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On the other hand, customary law has become a tool in the hands of 
politicians seeking to assure Africans of their unique historical 
cultural heritage. Politicians blame the Western system for their lack 
of economic development, even as they derive benefits from it. As a 
result, handouts from politicians, foreign aid workers, and donor 
institutions supplant the formal private law system and promote 
dependency on customary social systems. 
While each side seeks to blame the other, both positions fail to 
acknowledge that this undesirable situation is created by the 
interaction of formal and informal legal regimes. More specifically, 
both politicians and private foreign and local investors are able to 
exploit the situation to their own ends at the expense of ordinary 
Africans. In other words, it is not possible to delineate a “safe” 
sphere for private investors governed by Western-derived private law 
that is above and outside this chaotic scene. Western laws have 
created layered social and economic dependency, rather than 
freedom and economic dignity for Africans. 
Some argue that this resulting interplay between customary law 
and western private law is the state of chaos likely to exist in the 
absence of law and order.71 It is no surprise, they argue, that this state 
of chaos will not be magically remedied by implementation of 
Western-derived colonial or postcolonial law because, in both 
instances, the laws were influenced by the toxic and unshakeable 
politics of unjust acquisition and exploitation. And further, rather 
than dispelling colonial law-induced systemic chaos, customary law 
perpetuates it. To them, the way out of this morass is a combination 
of political, economic, social, and cultural reforms. This includes the 
aggressive pursuit of an individualist unitary private law system. 
These steps would bring order by installing a clear sphere of 
individual property rights and a defined private/public distinction. 
Under this theorization of the problem, the first legal fields ripe for 
reform are contract and property law because they unquestionably 
 
 71. Compare Mutua, supra note 42, at 205-10, 243 (alleging that the 
contemporary human rights movement focuses on eliminating the “savage 
cultures” of non-Western states through the introduction of Eurocentric views of 
rule of law and the development of human rights), with ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (contending that 
order can exist within states and societies without Western ideals of the rule of 
law). 
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value efficiency. Contract and property reform is a natural outcome 
of the declaration that customary law is an impediment to economic 
advancement.72 The stark contrast reform proponents believe exists 
between formal contract and property law on the one hand and 
custom on the other hand leads them to depart from custom in the 
pursuit of social and economic policy.73 And by citing social and 
economic justifications, they remain well within the exception 
embedded in their logically rational private law argument scheme. 
But a trap beckons. They must pursue Western contract and property 
law reform with a vigor that demonstrates the inefficiency of custom; 
otherwise, it becomes difficult to justify the abandonment of 
customary laws that have been in place for centuries. In other words, 
because installation of Western law would intrude on embedded 
local norms, it must be supported by strong justification and logical 
rationalization. 
The characteristics necessary to delineate a stark contrast between 
customary law on the one hand and contract and property on the 
other are well-established under Western private law theory—moral 
individualism and an exclusive system whose outcomes are always 
“fair” even if widespread pain and suffering results from their 
prescription as law or policy. Disregarding the argument that the 
customary system was originally abandoned because it produces 
barbaric and intolerable pain and chaos, the theoretical debate now 
focuses on determining which system—the African customary 
system or the Western legal system—causes less pain and maximizes 
administrative efficiency. Unlike the past scholarly approaches to 
African private law, this debate asks whether assumptions about 
 
 72. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic 
Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 368 (1997) (concluding that contract furthers 
and completes customary law and norms by providing a legal framework for the 
regulation of highly specific activities that would otherwise be outside the scope of 
customary law). But see Godden & Tehan, supra note 63, at 20 (questioning the 
assumption of policy prescriptions based on western notions of economic 
development, and advocating solutions based on existing systems of communal 
property). 
 73. See supra Part III; cf. Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 3, at 121-29 (suggesting 
the development of private law in the realm of individual property ownership, such 
as laws regarding succession and administration, is necessary in order to address 
the inadequacies of traditional remedies, while still recognizing that the current 
property system is the result of the circumstances and “accidents” of history). 
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system efficiency and coherence are accurate.74 Reform then is not 
about questioning the premises of the system, but working to 
improve the system on the assumption that it produces less pain and 
greater administrative efficiency overall. 
Such private law reform, however, does not come without a shift 
in the “pain” it causes. In recent decades, three institutions have been 
active sites for minimizing the painful outcomes of private law 
reform in Africa: the family, the state, and human rights 
organizations. Burdens are unevenly distributed across the three, 
depending on the nature of the issue and the institution’s role in 
society. For instance, care of the elderly is traditionally the 
responsibility of the family, while urban housing has increasingly 
fallen under the auspices of the state. An important assumption in 
choosing and prioritizing these projects is that people of poorer 
nations—who tolerate a private law regime that produces higher 
levels of pain—should have states, charity, and family ready to mop 
up the costs. Currently, international institutions and western 
development partners have stepped in to fill this role, perpetuating 
the cycle by standing ready to save the private sector from legal 
liability and moral accountability.75 
V. DISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES OF LEGAL PLURALISM  
Ironically, even though reformers have sought the abandonment of 
the customary law regime, it subsidizes the formal regime of private 
law. For example, in the current system, the family mops up a lot of 
the pain generated by private law sanctioned activity. Women and 
children, often identified as needing liberation from the customary 
law system, subsidize the private sector by supplying cheap or free 
labor to ailing workers rather than requiring companies to pay 
workers sufficient wages to pay for health care. They, therefore, 
alleviate the pain caused by the private law system by providing a 
service that has little to no value in the private law sanctioned 
 
 74. See generally Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 10, at 714 (refuting 
arguments that reward presumptive efficiency to either private property or free 
contract based solely on theoretical rational maximization behavior). 
 75. Cf. Mutua, supra note 42, at 233-43 (describing the efforts of international 
institutions and western powerbrokers in the developing world, particularly Africa, 
as attempts at becoming a savior through the dissemination of western policies and 
reforms and through financial support and management of national organizations). 
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marketplace. Similarly, rather than having companies pay workers 
hefty damages for tortious injury, this too is subsidized by families. 
These contributions of African families obviate the need to develop a 
tort law regime that adequately redresses harm or a contracts regime 
cognizant of the plight of low wage workers and their vulnerable 
dependents. The reliance interests of workers are discounted and the 
expectations of dependents are dashed.76 Thus, while some reliance 
on families to soak up the pain created by private law may be 
required, a reformed contract law regime should partially shift the 
burden to other legal regimes, such as torts, limiting the burden on 
families.  
The customary system has its own much-derided economy. Yet 
this economy exists in part because the formal economy generates 
demand for exploitative relationships. For instance, in areas of Africa 
which rely on subsistence farming or low-wage work, very few 
people can afford to access modern hospitals. As a result, the 
majority seek the services of traditional doctors and herbalists. While 
affordable, these traditional doctors and herbalists are also 
spectacularly unsuited to meet the needs of a national public health 
system.77 The same dynamic plagues sector after sector—security, 
education, transport, housing, sanitation, agriculture, to name but a 
few. 
State welfare programs are another way of subsidizing the private 
law regime in Africa. For example, state involvement in slum 
housing upgrade schemes often serve to entrench private sector 
profiteering and save the private sector from paying fair wages or 
negotiating fair employment contracts.78 Slum dwellers typically 
 
 76. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (describing the reliance interest of workers as well as 
their dependents in private companies’ property and the legal precedent to protect 
such an interest in the context of the closing of private companies and industries). 
 77. See, e.g., World Health Org. Reg’l Office for Africa, Achieving Sustainable 
Health Development in the African Region: Strategic Directions for WHO, 2010-
2015 8-9 (2010) (claiming that inadequate health resources and limited health 
infrastructure in Africa, among other factors, continue to plague the African 
population with insufficient access to health resulting in such health epidemics as 
high maternal mortality rations (550 to 1000 deaths per 100,000 live births in 
thirty-one African nations) and high rates of death in children (4.2 million in 2008) 
from preventable or treatable diseases). 
 78. Cf. U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, supra note 66, at 134 
(acknowledging that market-oriented approaches have tended to increase social 
1148 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
supply labor to affluent urban suburbs, factories, industries, and other 
private institutions. The state becomes involved by providing health 
services programs to take care of people adversely affected by 
corporate industrial waste or environmental disasters, for instance, or 
by resettling communities displaced by real estate developers. 
Yet a third way of removing the pain caused by private law is 
through the human rights regime. Like the welfare regime, human 
rights programs are funded by the state, as well as by charities, 
foreign aid, and development aid. Currently, without a working tort 
law regime, people harmed in the private sector marshal human 
rights arguments such as the right to health, housing, and education. 
In such circumstances, the human rights regime in significant 
measure amounts to a subsidy for the private sector. For instance, 
when people are displaced from their land by a private developer, 
human rights arguments are used to force the state to resettle them.79 
Or when private industrialists who pollute water sources are never 
forced under private law principles to clean up, state funds are used 
to clean up the pollution and provide treatment to victims. These 
state funds are used under a theory of the human right to clean water. 
More recently, the human rights regime has also warmed up to 
enforcing economic rights.80 The challenge of enforcing economic 
rights is that they require enforcement by an individual against the 
state as justiciable rights.81 International aid, by contrast, depends on 
 
inequality). 
 79. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 11, 214 
(Nov. 28, 2007) (holding that Suriname violated Article 21 (right to property) of 
the American Convention on Human Rights when the state displaced the Saramaka 
people following the flooding of their traditional territory in the 1960s, and 
ordering Suriname to “delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title” over the 
Saramaka’s land). See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Rep. of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Addendum: Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement: Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, 
submitted pursuant to Comm’n Res. 1997/39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
(Feb. 11, 1998) (introducing a set of principles to guide state actors, 
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations on the necessary 
protections and available rights to internally displaced persons, including their 
right not to be displaced due to development projects). 
 80. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and 
Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 (2003) (providing an 
overview of the debate regarding constitutionalization of socio-economic rights). 
 81. See, e.g., Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
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the funding priorities of the donor.  
A final means of reducing private law pain is through private, 
institutional, and governmental aid. Institutional aid has taken an 
interesting character, particularly with the rise of Chinese investment 
in Africa.82 Western donors have long used aid packages to force 
African governments to adopt free market systems.83 Aid is also a 
staple of Western foreign policy that is usually a mix of carrot and 
sticks aimed to ensure the pursuit and protection of western interests 
in recipient nations.84 Although China’s official policy in Africa has 
been “noninterference in domestic affairs,”85 recently China has 
included aid packages in investment agreements. This begs the 
question: instead of aid, why not implement a private law system that 
requires investors to observe basic private law principles, such as fair 
dealing and adequate recompense for harm? In theory, this would 
reduce economic dependency by placing the social costs of private 
law sanctioned activity at their source, breaking the cycle of 
exploitation. 
 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery 
Established Thereby art. 34, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. 155, 2061 A-2889 U.N.T.S 7 
(empowering the European Court of Human Rights to receive applications from 
individuals claiming a violation of the articles of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms against any signatory state to the 
Convention). 
 82. See Ngaire Woods, Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging 
Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance, 84 INT’L AFF. 1205, 
1215 (2008) (linking Chinese aid to Africa with Chinese investments and trade, 
which grew by seven hundred percent in the 1990s eventually reaching $55.5 
billion in 2006); see also Stephanie Hanson, China, Africa, and Oil, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (June 6, 2008), www.cfr.org/china/china-africa-oil/p9557 (noting 
that China ranks as Africa’s second-highest trading partner behind the United 
States). 
 83. See Steven Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid 13 (Cr. for Global Dev., 
Working Paper No. 92, 2006) (discussing typical conditionalities that donors, 
particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, place upon aid 
programs to require recipients to adhere to donors’ interests and economic 
policies). 
 84. Cf. id. at 6 (summarizing how the United States and the Soviet Union 
donated aid to developing nations during the Cold War to acquire support and 
influence and noting that many Western states still supply aid to former colonies to 
maintain political influence). 
 85. Hanson, supra note 83. 
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VI. INTERDEPEDENCE OF FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL LAW 
A more robust private law regime could achieve many of the aims 
of the government, family, and donor programs. But to do this, such 
a private law regime must get out of the trap that “Western derived 
law must always be clearly distinguished from customary law,” or 
that there ought to be a distinction of the private and public, and 
instead focus on the development of a legal regime that integrates the 
concerns of both customary and private law. A less rigid system is 
not a system of handouts, but a system focused on fairness. Fairness 
is at the root of Western private law philosophy and practice as can 
be demonstrated by various principles:86 property should be lawfully 
acquired, not grabbed; contracts should promote equal bargaining, 
not institutionalize inequality; and in torts, one who harms another 
should restore the injured party to wholeness. Handouts and 
subsidies should not be mixed with these principles because they are 
not an adequate substitute for fairness. 
If Africa’s economic prospects depend on private law, private law 
must be taken seriously. To start with, this means both recognizing 
and challenging the basic assumptions underlying Western private 
law, such as the link between custom and economic backwardness. 
Scholars have recognized that the causal link between Western 
private law and Western economic advancement is tenuous.87 
Second, custom is a well-recognized attribute of Western law,88 
 
 86. See generally LUCY, supra note 49 (analyzing the foundations and 
normative components of legal liability-responsibility in private law along with the 
various theories of compensation and corrective or distributive justice associated 
with private law). 
 87. See, e.g., Brietzke, supra note 9, at 151 (noting that while Professor Rene 
David’s theory of codification “presupposes that the French legal model and its 
related assumptions are the appropriate ones from the standpoint of Ethiopian 
development . . . [, the] French private laws were not instrumental in securing a 
broadly-based development in their country of origin . . . and it is unlikely that they 
will be so in Ethiopia”). 
 88. See generally David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: 
Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996) (discussing 
the various ways by which customary easements of public access to beaches are 
recognized, including by common law doctrine, statute, recognition by judicial 
activists, and customary rights of indigenous groups); Alan Watson, An Approach 
to Customary Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. R. 561 (discussing the transformation of Roman 
customary norms into law). 
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further attenuating the link between custom and economic 
backwardness in Africa; this link is based on inaccurate assumptions 
about Western private law. Taking private law seriously in Africa 
would require taking Western private law seriously. The comparative 
contrast, assumed to exist between Western private law and 
“traditional” African legal concepts and which subsequently informs 
law reform programs, mischaracterizes both African and Western 
ideas of law. Mischaracterization leads to false dichotomization of 
the two systems, false characterization of the nexus between Western 
private law and economic development,89 ineffective law reform 
programs, and eventually leads to intractable instability and conflict. 
Systems of law may be different, but abstracting legal difference into 
capsule prescriptions is a meaningless expenditure of effort with 
inescapable chilling effects.90 
CONCLUSION 
Private law has not served Africa well. There has been an 
excessive focus on installation of institutions of positive law, and 
little attention paid to basic questions such as: what is the function 
and purpose of private law in Africa? There has not existed a system 
of post-installation periodic performance review of private law 
institutions. At this point in history, the function and purpose of 
private law in Africa should be to achieve for Africa economic 
dignity and political say over global matters. If these are the twin 
goals, it is pointless to continue trying to force Africa to follow the 
same path of legal development as the West; legal reforms in Africa 
driven by the prospect of reconciling tensions within the law will not 
succeed because no system in the world has ever achieved that goal. 
A performance review of private law in Africa will reveal that the 
private sector enjoys unacknowledged subsidies from the state, 
family, and charity. This not only points to an important conceptual 
 
 89. Cf. Brietzke, supra note 9, at 151-52 (listing the similarities in the 
development and substance of the Civil and Commercial Codes of France and 
Ethiopia, while detailing how the French codes arose out of the French “social 
field” and highlighting the necessity for the Ethiopian codes to develop from the 
radically different Ethiopian needs and demands). 
 90. See generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking 
Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 411 (1985) (highlighting the problems of 
bias and perspective in comparative legal studies). 
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problem in how we think about private law in Africa, but also to the 
fact that under such a scheme, private law has been retarded rather 
than developed. 
 
